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ABSTRACT: 
 
In this paper the Congress-led United Progressive Alliance (UPA) (2005-)’s 
approach to federalism in India is critically examined in the backdrop of India’s 
ongoing globalization  since the early 1990s, and a comparative assessment of the 
same in relation to the BJP-led National Democratic Alliance’s approach to 
federalism in India is also offered. The shift is evident in renewed interest in the 
role of the states, more autonomy to the states, further sub-state level 
decentralization, and finally, enhancement of the capacity of the states. The 
appropriate institutional reforms for the same being undertaken are also discussed. 
It is argued here that the paradigmatic shift evident in the UPA’s approach to 
federalism in India is in fact partly a continuation of the same from the NDA 
regime, if not earlier, the common determining factor being the compulsion of 
structural reforms. It is further argued that coalitional compulsions coupled with 
the compulsion of carrying out structural reforms have meant that the BJP (NDA) 
had to mellow down its sharp edge of Hindutva nationhood, and the Congress 
(UPA) has turned softer on ethno-cultural identity issues in matters of governance. 
The paper finally maintains some reservations about the long term effect of the 
market-propelled federal institutional reforms in India on distributional conflicts in 
a complex multiethnic country of India’s size and diversity. 
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 The paper was originally presented at an International Conference on „UPA (2004-
09) in Power in India‟ at the School of Oriental and African Studies, London 
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THE PROBLEM 
 
Thomas Kuhn has used the term „paradigm‟ in scientific discourse in his 
now classic The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (1962) to refer, among 
others, to a conceptual framework, or, a theoretical framework, a model, or a 
problematic. In the ongoing theoretical literature on federalism, the term 
„paradigm‟ has acquired a specific meaning, which should be explained for 
our purpose here. When looked at historically, federalism has so far been 
conjoined to liberalism, social welfarism and socialism. At origin though, 
federalism flourished in liberal conditions because individual liberty was the 
sine quo non of federalism too. Alex De Tocqueville (Galligan 2009: 264) in 
particular drew our attention to this foundational notion of US federalism. 
The incompatibility between federalism and socialism is now proven in 
theory and practice. But, remarkably, federalism has adapted itself to social 
welfarism, as some recent theoretical literature on federalism seems to 
suggest. (Obinger, Castles and Liebfried 2005) It is argued that there is in 
fact no conflict between federalism and the welfare state because „in multi-
ethnic federations, social policy may serve as the cement for reducing the 
depths of political cleavages‟. (Obinger, Castles and Liebfried 2005: 6) This 
means that a certain degree of functionality of the social interventionist state 
in maintaining federalism itself in multiethnic countries is to be recognized. 
However, the consensus today in this regard is that there is a paradigmatic 
shift for federalism. Watts (Watts 2008: 4) expresses this shift when he says 
that „we appear to be moving from a world of sovereign nation-states to a 
world of diminished state sovereignty and increased interstate linkages of a 
constitutionally federal character.‟ Today‟s resurgence of federalism with 
Europe as the „epicentre of federalist tendency‟ (Galligan 2009: 262) is 
caused mostly by the forces of globalization, and is manifested in major 
institutional reconfigurations: cosmopolitanism, multiple spheres of 
government, shifting allegiances, new forms of identity, and overlapping 
jurisdiction. Federalism today is increasingly seen to be the form of 
governance in a world marked, on the one hand, by the decline of 
Keynesianism in favour of neo-liberal economics, and on the other hand, the 
decline of socialism in favour of market solutions in most domestic 
economies. Federalism appears to be reorienting itself to the requirements of 
the market.  While that refers to the emerging international scenario, within 
the nation-state it refers to the gradual withdrawal of the social welfare state, 
increasing shrinkage of public expenditure, and opening up the social and 
economic space for the market forces to play their role. Rudolph and 
Rudolph (2001: 161) would term the shift, in the light of the developments 
in India since the late 1980s, as the one from an interventionist state giving 
way to a regulatory state suited to India‟s emerging reality of liberalization, 
multi-party coalition governments at the Centre and so on. There is of course 
a caution in Rudolphs‟ (2001: 162) understanding of the shift when they say 
that in India „a relatively centralized and interventionist state‟ [.. ]„is being 
replaced by a relatively decentralized regulatory state willing to rely on, but 
not to surrender, to a market economy..‟. The above statement indicates that 
India defines it own course of change conditioned by a complex set of 
factors generally relating to the federal structure of the state as a whole, a 
change which is neither wholly selling out to the market forces, nor 
withdrawing the social welfare state entirely. However, one would notice in 
UPA‟s approach to federalism an unmistakable shift towards globalization 
and the market forces in restructuring Indian federalism, in particular greater 
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emphasis on the States which are the most critical actors in making 
globalization work in India.   
 
 
ARGUMENT 
 
It will be argued here that the programmatic statements, policy measures, 
and the institutional steps for long-term reforms of the federal structure, 
adopted and implemented by the first United Progressive Alliance (UPA) 
(2004-09) government at the Centre headed by the Indian National Congress 
(INC) (henceforth Congress) in favour of the States indicate that there is 
perhaps a shift in approaching federalism in India. Several caveats are in 
order here, however. First, the changes that necessitated a shift in 
perspective have been path-dependent so that there was no going back to the 
old days of centralization and concentration of powers at the Centre, and of 
Centre-States confrontation that marked many periods of Congress rule, 
most notably of late Mrs. Indira Gandhi (former Prime Minister) (Dua 1979; 
Dua 1985)
3
 Second, liberalization of the Indian economy, and its opening up 
in the wake of globalization since the early 1990s has been profoundly 
determining in this regard. While India has been benefiting from 
globalization (the steady growth in the economy even in the era of recession 
being one powerful indicator), the economy has to be opened up increasingly 
for implementing the Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAP), in which, 
the strategic role of the States, as defined by the provisions of the Indian 
Constitution, is indispensable. Third, that there is some continuity in 
approach between the National Democratic Alliance (NDA), the UPA‟s 
immediate predecessor, and the UPA is because of the factor of 
globalization. Ideologically though, the NDA
4
 and UPA follow diametrically 
opposed approaches to federalism determined by their opposing conceptions 
of nationhood. But the NDA could not divert from India‟s path of 
globalization. The Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), the leader of the alliance, on 
                                                        
3
 Bhagwan Dua (1979) in his classic study of President‟s Rule in the Indian States  
showed with adequate statistical data how the Article 356 of the Indian Constitution 
pertaining to the dissolution of the State Governments and placing them under 
Central rule had been used and misused, (and mostly misused) by the Congress 
Party and also the Janata (1977-80) on partisan grounds. The Janata, he argued, 
followed only in the footsteps of Congress Party, and even surpassed it, by 
dissolving none Congress-ruled State Assemblies in 1977 by a single Presidential 
order, which was unprecedented. (p. 612) He said that „ Mrs. Indira Gandhi used the 
instrument for partisan reasons but also for personal reasons with a view to 
liquidating dissent against her autocratic rule‟. (p. 612). For further details, see his 
„Presidential Rule in India: A Study in Crisis Politics‟, Asian Survey, Vol. 19, No. 6 
(June 1979), pp. 612-26. In another classic article Dua („Federalism or 
Patrimonialism: The Making and Unmaking of Chief Ministers in India‟, Asia 
Survey, Vol. XXV, No. 8, August 1985, pp. 793-804) showed rampant 
patrimonialism of lat Mrs. Indira Gandhi during her last term in power (1980-84) in 
the making and unmaking of all Congress Chief Ministers of  States purely on very 
narrow partisan, and personal grounds: „In the process, the state legislatures were 
becoming increasingly irrelevant, if not redundant, in the making and unmaking of 
chief ministers.‟ (p. 803) Noticing the lay of one-party dominance, Dua commented: 
'Over the years, therefore, her own conception of good management of state politics 
was reduced to one principle: keep all state leaders on perennial probation‟ (p. 804)      
4
 Adeney, K. (2005) „Hindu Nationalists and federal structures in an era of 
regionalism‟ in Adeney, K. and Saez, L. (eds) Coalition Politics and Hindu 
Nationalism, London: Routledge, 97-115 
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the contrary, moderated the sharp edge of its Hindutva ideology after being 
in power. Finally, the coalitional logic at the Centre, the UPA being a 14-
party alliance of mostly state-based and regional parties, dictated the shift in 
approach to federalism so that the rights of the States are adequately 
recognized and protected, and that the States are allowed to play an active 
role in development rather than being simply treated as „glorified 
municipalities‟ (a condescending epithet used in the mass media and among 
some sections of the intellectuals) in Indian federalism.  
 
 
A BRIEF HISTORY 
 
Since 1950 when federalism was inaugurated in post-independence India, 
Indian federalism has been subject to a lot of shifts and turns, differentiation 
and centralization, assertion of states rights and decline in federalism, crisis 
and restoration. (Bhattacharyya 2001& 2005) Post 1967, buoyed by the loss 
of Congress dominance, the States began to assert themselves against 
centralization and for more autonomy, revision of centre-state relations and 
so on. In the post-Emergency (1975-77) period, the renewed centralization 
after the rise to power of the Congress again in 1980 (1980-84) (Dua 1985) 
saw vigorous campaign against centralization and for more State autonomy. 
(Kurian and Varugheese 1981) Bagchi (2003: 21-42) has noted many shifts 
in Indian federalism: increasing institutional recommendations for more 
State autonomy (Sarkaria Commission, 1987; NCRWC 2002) ; sub-state 
level decentralization since the early 1990s; the States‟ reluctance to devolve 
powers down the sub-State level decentralized bodies, and so on. 
  
There is little disagreement among scholars on Indian federalism that 
the federation (constitutionally titled „Union of States‟) was designed to be 
very centralized, for a variety of reasons, although operationally the strategic 
significance of the States (federal units) in implementing their own as well 
as, and more importantly, the federal legislations including a variety of 
welfare programmes, was recognized by some acute observers of Indian 
federalism (Morris-Jones 1967; 1987; Watts 1966; 1999; 2008) From one 
estimate, it is found that during 2000-04 India‟s federal government 
expenditure after intergovernmental transfers remains 44.6 per cent of the 
total public expenditure
5
which is only next the US, and lower than that of 
Malaysia, Brazil, Nigeria, Australia, Mexico, Austria, Spain, and South 
Africa. (Watts 2008: 103). This means India‟s States together are responsible 
for more than half the public expenditure. It must, however, be mentioned 
that during the heyday of one-party dominance (of the Congress), and state 
welfarism, and the so-called license-permit raj, Indian federalism suffered 
additionally from the high doses of political centralization. The extent of 
political interference in formal aspects of relations between the Centre and 
the States in India during the height of political centralization is a subject of 
some dispute among scholars. (Brass 1989; Austin 1999; Rao and Singh 
2005; Bhattacharyya 2009) The States in India though suffer from the 
problem of fiscal imbalances, between their rising expenditure and decline in 
revenues. For example, during 1990-2002 central transfers to the States in 
                                                        
5
  The figures were 47.3 per cent in 1986 and 54.8 per cent in 1994 for India. For 
further details, see Watts (1999), p. 47. The figures went up during the 1990s due to 
a more centralizing turn under the Congress led government at the centre during 
1991-96. 
Harihar Bhattacharyya  
 
H E I D E L B E R G  P A P E R S  I N  S O U T H  A S I A N  A N D  C O M P A R A T I V E  P O L I T I C S  
h t t p : / / h p s a c p . u n i - h d . d e /  
W o r k i n g  P a p e r  N o .  5 5 ,  J u n e  2 0 1 0                                               5 
India had not increased but dwindled, and stayed mostly at around 38 per 
cent.
6
  
 
Since the dominance of the Congress Party from the pre-independence 
days over Indian politics, its near total suzerainty over the Constituent 
Assembly (1946-49), and over Indian politics at the Centre and the States 
until 1967 was inextricably linked with the fate of Indian federalism, its 
defining moment, its post-independence survival and emaciated operation, 
formally speaking, the loss of dominance of the party in the fourth general 
elections in 1967 for the first time since independence and the subsequent 
split (s) in the party itself prepared the basis for the States‟ assertions of 
rights, autonomy and resources, and for a revision of Centre-States relations. 
Elsewhere, I have examined the dialectic between centralization, on the one 
hand, and the demand for state autonomy, on the other, as well as the 
changing contours of Indian federalism. (Bhattacharyya 2001; 2005; and 
Bhattacharyya 2009: 99-119) At the Centre, the rise of multi-party coalition 
governments since the late 1980s had produced increasingly less assertive 
Central government but more assertive State governments, and proved 
congenial for federalism.   
 
 
NEW CONTEXT 
 
The recent assessment of Indian federalism, more particularly since the 
1990s, (Majeed ed. 2009;Arora and Verney eds. 1995; Manor 1998 & 2001; 
Arora 2004; Bhattacharyya 2001; & 2009; Dua and Singh 2003; Rudolph 
and Rudolph 2001; Das Gupta 2001; Saez 2002; Rao and Singh 2005) 
highlights variously the vastly changed context of Indian federalism in 
respect of the impact of globalization as well as the growing importance of 
coalition politics with state-based parties at the Centre. Elsewhere 
(Bhattacharyya 2009) I have discussed the contending issues involved, 
which I will sum up for bringing out the appropriate backdrop of the UPA 
government‟s renewed commitment to federalism since 2004. After some 
failed experiments (1977-80; 1989-91; and 1996-98) of non-Congress 
coalition governments at the Centre, India witnessed since the late 1990s the 
rise of stable multi-party coalition governments at the Centre which seem to 
show the pattern of politics that India is going to have from now on. This has 
coincided with India‟s path to globalization too. The rise of multi-party 
coalition at the Centre implied increasing rise into prominence of the 
regional, State-based parties at the Centre, which seemed favourable for 
federalism because it offered the States more autonomy of action. This 
process also became inevitably linked with India‟s globalization. Rudolph 
and Rudolph (2001) remarked that in the 1990s, „a multi-party system with 
strong regional parties displaced a dominant party system; and market forces 
and practices displaced the planning and the “license-permit raj”. (Rudolph 
and Rudolph 2001: 129) They further argue that the „federal system has had 
a new lease of life, with the States gaining ground at the expense of the 
centre‟. (Rudolph and Rudolph 2001: 129) This may indeed be painting too 
optimistic a scenario because not all States in India are able to reap equally 
the benefits of the emergent reality. There was and still is, indeed, a lot of 
disparity among the States in this respect. For example, in the first decade of 
                                                        
6
 Rao, G. and Singh, N. (2005) The Political Economy of Indian Federalism (Delhi: 
OUP), p. 192. 
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India‟s globalization, the following was the per capita (in Rupees) Foreign 
Direct Investment (FDI) in India‟s major states: Bihar (102.27); Karnataka 
(4628.06); Maharashtra (5780.38); West Bengal (1237.32); Uttar Pradesh 
(311.29); and Madhya Pradesh (1476.39).
7
 However, the directions of 
change are unmistable.  
 
While the two became to be interlinked, the States were not as much 
involved, until the mid-1990s, in India‟s reforms process. Guhan (Guhan 
1995) believes that the Centre was until then both „unwilling and unable‟ to 
involve the States in the process for a number of reasons: the external 
agencies‟ preference for policy dialogue with the national government alone; 
the Centre‟s responsibility for macro-economic stabilization; and the 
variegated nature of State governments, politically speaking. (Bhattacharyya 
2009: 112) But, as the section below will show, the states in Indian 
federation hold a strategic position, and it is in the states that any reforms 
had to be implemented, if at all. Thus, the Centre itself became more 
interested in involving the states in the reforms process as a matter of 
compulsion, although, it must said, not to the same extent and with as much 
success because the States in India, themselves very complex in nature, are 
placed too unequally along the social and economic scales of development to 
reap the benefits of development accruing from globalization. Also, the State 
governments in India, placed as they are in specific socio-political complex, 
have different mandates to their populace, which are often at variance with 
more uniform and homogenous process of globalization. The states were not 
in all cases willing partners in the reforms process. (Bhattacharyya 2009) 
 
 
CONSTITUTIONAL POSITION OF THE STATES 
 
Indian federation distributes powers and responsibilities between the Centre 
(Union) and the States in terms of three lists: Union, State and Concurrent. 
The Union List contains 97 items which are nationally important and give 
the Union Government overriding powers. The State List contains 66 items, 
and the Concurrent List contains 47 items, on which the Union Government 
will have supremacy in case of conflict.  Legislatively, the Union 
Government is very powerful having overriding powers of legislation on 
Concurrent List and also on some items in the State List in certain 
circumstances. However, a narrow reading of the constitutional provisions 
would of course give a wrong picture of the working of the federation, which 
has remained, operationally speaking, decentralized. (Watts 1966 & 2008)         
 
Constitutionally too, the States in India occupy a strategic space. 
Administratively speaking, the Union government is „all staff and no line‟ 
(Appleby 1953). The States are thus responsible for implementation of their 
own legislations as well as the Central government‟s all welfare and 
developmental legislations and programmes, which are to be taken down to 
the grassroots for implementation.   From the point of view of globalization, 
i.e. implementation of the agenda of globalization, the strategic role of the 
States is too obvious. As Guhan has rightly pointed out, the key sectors in 
this respect fall within the competence of the States: industrial infrastructure; 
power development; agriculture; and its allied sectors; and irrigation; roads 
(other than highways), health, education, medical services; nutrition, water 
                                                        
7
 Rao and Singh (2005), p. 382. 
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supply; and urban development and so on.  (Guhan 1995: 241) Therefore, it 
was imperative on the part of the Central government to involve the States in 
the reforms process, and hence the States have become more important to the 
Centre. 
 
 
UPA’S APPROACH TO FEDERALISM 
 
Being a 14-party
8
 coalition government---most of them being State-based 
and regionally oriented---, (and some of them having left the coalition 
subsequently),
9
 supported from outside by the left parties, accommodation of 
states‟ interests naturally received considerable policy attention and the 
voice of the States had to be reckoned with. To give but one odd example: 
since the Left Front supported the UPA government for most its period from 
outside, the Chief Minister, Mr. Buddhadev Bhattacharya, the Chief Minster 
of the Left Front run state of West Bengal did not complain of the Centre‟s 
neglect of the State even though the Left had withdrawn support to the UPA 
on Indo-US nuclear policy issue, and suffered severest electoral reverses in 
the State in the Lok Sabha elections in 2009. Compare this with the periods 
until the 1990s and part of 2000 when the Marxists were in the forefront of 
the „struggle against the Centre‟, against the latter‟s „step-motherly attitude‟ 
to the States and so on. The CPI-M, for one, had harped on ever since its rise 
in 1964 on the issue of autonomy of the States (more powers to the States), 
and a revision of the centre-state relations. The party‟s famous 01 December 
1977 Memorandum on the Centre-States Relations is known for its advocacy 
for both a strong Centre and strong States.
10
 (Bhattacharyya 2009: 110-11) 
To take the example of DMK (Dravida Munnetra Kazagham) (based on 
Tamil ethno-regional interests), the ally of two successive UPAs (2004- ), 
the party is avowedly regionalist and federalist. Its 2004 Election Manifesto 
for the Lok Sabha elections defined itself as „democratic movement to 
                                                        
8
 The pre-poll allies of the UPA were: RJD, DMK, NCP, PMK, TRS, JMM, 
MDMK, AIMIM, PDR, IUML, RPI (A), RPI (G) and KC (I). RJD=Rashtriya Janata 
Dal; DMK=Dravida Munntetra Kazagham; NCP=National Congress Party; PMK=  
TRS=Telengana Rashtra Samiti; JMM=Jharkhand Mukti Morcha;   
9
 The Telengana Rashtra Samiti (TRS), an ally (with five Members of Parliament) of 
the UPA (2004-09), left the coalition on 23 September 2006, and all its members 
including its leader Mr K. Chandra Sekha Rao, Union Labour Minister, resigned 
from Lok Sabha, and the Ministry respectively on grounds of the UPA‟s failure to 
implement its promise in the Common Minimum Programme, namely, the formation 
of a separate State of Telengana carving up Andhra Pradesh. The party leader Mr 
Rao alleged: „In fact, both Mrs Gandhi (Sonia Gandhi) and Mr Reddy (Congress 
party Chief Minister of Andhra Pradesh)donned Telengana colours with our map for 
the separate State when they went on the election tour in the region.‟ 
(http://www.thehindu.com/2006/09/24/stories/2006092421550100.htm accesssed on 
15 Nov 2009) The TRS joined the NDA on 10March 2009, as the BJP had stated 
that it stood for small States! It is also not true that the UPA has sat idle on the issue 
because the UPA government had constituted a Committee with Mr Pranab 
Mukherjee, now Finance Minister, as its chairman to look into the matter. On 
January 08 2008 the UPA government formed the Second States Reorganization 
Commission to reorganize India further and to consider the creation of new States.    
10
 It is stated forcefully in the said document: We are definitely for strong states, but 
on no account do we want a weak Centre. The concept of strong states is not 
necessarily in contradiction to that of a strong Centre, once their respective spheres 
of authority are clearly marked out‟. Kurian and Varughese eds. 1981, p. 210 quoted 
in Bhattacharyya 2009: 111).  
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preserve and protect the rights of Tamil People and to achieve the ideals of 
Periyar. DMK has been working towards an egalitarian, secular society free 
of caste - communal conflicts. It is also working tirelessly to uphold the 
culture, language, arts and civilization of the Tamils.‟ In a separate section in 
the manifesto titled „FEDERALISM’, the party stated its position: 
 
It is DMK‟s consistent stand that the Constitution should be 
amended for the creation of a wholesome and genuine Federalism 
with fuller autonomy for the states. A resolution insisting the State 
Autonomy was passed in the Tamil Nadu Legislative Assembly way 
back in 1974 itself by the DMK. DMK will continue to insist the 
abolition of Article 356 which empowers the dismissal of state 
governments. It will continue to strive for the suitable Constitutional 
amendments that will empower the states to function freely and 
effectively in the changed new world order.  
 
Its 2009 Manifesto reiterated much of its 2004 one. The party asserts „The 
time has now ripened for the constitutional federalism to blossom out of the 
existing political federalism‟. It is beyond doubt that such regional and 
States‟ rights centric views, demands and programmes as maintained by the 
UPA‟s partners would have impacted upon the tenor of UPA‟s approach to 
federalism, and centre-state relations.   
 
 
‘REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT, CENTRE-STATE RELATIONS’  
 
This sub-heading is taken directly from the Common Minimum Programme 
(CMP May 2004) of the UPA (2004-09), and indicative of the perspective 
from which the issue of „centre-state relations‟ was sought to be viewed. It is 
regional imbalances in development, that is, the States had lagged behind 
development, and that they had received unfair treatment in the past in 
respect of financial devolution, and plan allocations etc, which constituted an 
important part of the UPA‟s approach to federalism. The CMP was very 
candid on this point: 
 
The UPA government is committed to redressing growing regional 
imbalances both among states as well as within states, through fiscal 
administrative, investment and other means. It is a matter of concern 
that regional imbalances have been accentuated by not only historical 
neglect but also by distortions in Plan allocations and central 
government assistance. Even in the Tenth Five Year Plan, states like 
Bihar, Assam and UP have received per capita allocations that are much 
below the national average. 
 
The CMP proposed several measures for arresting these imbalances: the 
creation of a Backward States Grant Fund for creating productive assets in 
these states; („proactive measures‟) rapid industrialization in the eastern and 
northeastern states;  alleviation of debt burden of the states; provision for 
non-statutory grants from the Centre to the states to be weighted in favour of 
poor and backward states; emphasis on social and physical infrastructure 
development in the states; payment of mineral royalties to the states; speedy 
implementation of special economic packages of previous governments for 
the states in North-East, Bihar and Jammu and Kashmir; and so on. These 
can be seen as designed to enhance the capacity of the States, and to remove 
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the long-drawn anti-Centre attitudes and orientations among many states, 
particularly the backward ones in social and economic terms. 
 
The States-specific yet longstanding schemes (having „national 
significance‟) have also found their place in the UPA‟s approach to 
federalism. Thus the CMP committed the UPA government to the Sethu 
Samuthuriam project (Tamil Nadu), flood control and drainage in North 
Bihar, the Prevention of Erosion in Padmna-Ganga and Bhagirathi rivers in 
West Bengal and so on. One could match the above with the regional allies, 
and supporters, of the UPA: DMK; RJD and the left parties of West Bengal 
respectively. The special status that Jammu & Kashmir enjoys under Article 
370 of the Indian Constitution in comparison with other states of India is 
understood within the specific context of Indian federalism. The asymmetric 
arrangement with regard to J & K is widely accepted as part of India‟s 
federal structure. The CMP has committed the UPA government „to 
respecting the letter and spirit of Article 370‟, all possible help in bringing 
peace back to the state, and pledged full support to the state government
11
: 
„The healing touch policy pursued by the State government will be fully 
supported and an economic and humanitarian thrust provided to it.‟ The sub-
text of the above is that the PDP that ran the State government was a partner 
of the UPA. Finally, the pressing problems of India‟s North-East 
(comprising seven federal units, which are all recognized as „special 
category states‟), such as terrorism, militancy and insurgency, were 
considered as „a matter of urgent national priority‟. The CMP stated that all 
the States in this region would be given „special assistance‟ to upgrade and 
expand infrastructure, the basic conditions needed for implementing 
globalization. Development of the infrastructure has received continuous 
attention in the CMP! 
  
Those governmental measures apart, the UPA government, very 
significantly, pledged itself to relatively long-term institutional reforms of 
Indian federalism. It was argued that about two decades had elapsed since 
the last Commission (i.e.  Sarkaria Commission 1983-87) had reviewed the 
centre-state relations. So, the UPA government committed itself to setting up 
of a new Commission for the same purposes „keeping in view the sea-
changes that have taken place in the polity and economy of India since then‟. 
However, this is to be recorded that the NDA (1999-2004) had considered 
this, and took a bold step in setting up the National Commission to Review 
the Working of the Constitution in 2000, the report of which was submitted 
in 2002. Incidentally, Justice Sarkaria (who had chaired the first Centre-State 
Relations Commission in 1987) was also a member of this Commission. 
 
 
OFFICIAL LANGUAGE  
 
The UPA government‟s commitment to „official language‟ has important 
federal bearing. The CMP declared that the „UPA government will set up a 
committee to examine the question of declaring all languages in the Eighth 
Schedule of the Constitution as official languages‟. „In addition‟, it is further 
                                                        
11
 Two things must be stated here for clarity. First, it was during the Congress run 
government at the Centre in the past that J & K suffered, and the provisions of 
Article 370 was compromised. Second, the NDA was, and is still, ideologically 
committed to deletion of the very article that assures J & K‟s special status within 
Indian federation. 
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stated, „Tamil will be declared as a classical language.‟ While the latter is 
directly connected with the Manifesto of the DMK, an important ally of the 
UPA, the former is broadly connected with federalism in the sense that most 
of the major States of India were linguistically so created and hence the 
recognition of the 8th Schedule languages as „official languages‟ of India 
would definitely enhance their sense of ethno-regional-linguistic identity. 
This indicates also UPA‟s fundamental difference from the NDA on the 
socio-cultural basis of Indian federalism, and also Indian nationhood. 
 
 
PERFORMANCE 
 
It is true indeed that five years (in fact less than five years) may not be long 
enough for desired effects of policy to be visible. This is particularly true in 
cases of redress of imbalances in regional development, infrastructural 
development, investment and so on. But the UPA government (2004-09) in 
its public document „Report to the People, 2004-07‟ recorded many of its 
achievements in matters benefiting the States. To begin with, several 
measures are said to have taken to alleviate debt burden of the States: 
permission to refinance loans through market borrowings, if needed; 
retention of grant: loan ratio of 90: 10 for „special category states‟; 
introduction of new debt relief scheme for rescheduling all central loans 
contracted till 31. 3. 04 and outstanding as on 31. 3. 05 into fresh loans for 
20 years carrying 7.5% interests. (It is reported that some 20 States have 
availed of the benefit of debt waiver.)  
 
The States‟ share of tax devolution is stated to have increased by 81%, 
due to the new formula devised by the 11
th
 Union Finance Commission
12
 and 
accepted by the government, from Rs. 78, 595.00 crores in 2004-05 to Rs. 
142, 450.00 crore in 2007-08. The mineral royalty receipts to the States have 
been increased by 11.16% over 2005.  
 
The UPA government seems to have taken up the issue of security and 
development in India‟s North-East very seriously. Large scale alienation, 
especially of the youth, leading to insurgency and militancy has remained a 
major problem for peace and security in the region. The UPA government 
has introduced improved scheme of surrender and rehabilitation of the 
militants by providing for 20 % of vacancies of Constables in the Border 
Security Forces to areas affected by militancy. 100% central funding, 
additionally, has been provided for modernization of state police forces. For 
peace efforts, talks have been initiated with a host of militant groups, and the 
situation is said to have improved to some extent, in some States, most 
notably in Tripura. The usual governing practices of the Centre i.e., releasing 
huge financial-development packages for the North-East have also been 
maintained. The rehabilitation package known as „Operation Sadbhavana‟ 
Programme, which has been quite effective J & K, (more later below) has 
been extended to North-East.
13
  
 
                                                        
12
 The latest criteria with weightage of tax devolution is as follows: population 
(16%); Income (distance mode) 62.50%); areas (7.50%); index of infrastructure 
(7.50%) ; tax efforts (5%); and fiscal discipline ( 7.5% ). (Rao and Singh 2005: 201) 
13
 There is evidence that the programme has extended to the area. See for some 
details on its application for medical help to the people in Assam 
(http://sentinelassam.com/state2/story.php (accessed on 20 December 2009) 
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INSTITUTIONAL REVIVAL AND REFORMS 
 
It is widely accepted among scholars of Indian federalism that India‟s 
ongoing globalization processes necessitate „multiple interactions‟ (Rao and 
Singh 2005) and co-coordinated governmental actions at many levels. In a 
highly complex and diverse country of India‟s size, a centralized policy 
regime, a centralized planning, and a centralized bureaucratic hierarchy are 
simply inadequate particularly in the context of globalization. This is 
particularly so when the central government does not have the 
administrative/bureaucratic machinery to implement its own laws. The need 
for a truly federal, i.e., multiple, interactions has been well-recognized by the 
UPA government, which has adopted, on the one hand, the measures to 
revive the available federal institutional channels of interactions which went 
into disuse over the last few years.
14
 In the aptly phrased sub-heading 
„Collective Deliberations‟, the UPA government in its „Report to the People‟ 
said: 
 
In order to collectively deliberate upon and arrive at a common 
understanding and strategies concerning critical issues requiring 
coordinated action by the Centre and the States,‟ attempts have been 
made to activate the forums such as the National Development 
Council, the National Integration Council, the Inter-State Council, 
the Conferences on Internal Security and Law and Order, the Zonal 
Councils etc for facilitating frequent discussions with the Chief 
Ministers. 
 
On the other hand, the second Commission on Centre-State Relations, 
known as the Punchhi (after its Chairman (retd.) Chief Justice of India Mr. 
Madan Mohan Punchhi) Commission has been formed (on 27
th
 April 2007 as 
per the Resolution of the Government of India dated 30
th
 April 2005) with a 
mandate which reflects concerns of the vastly changed surrounding reality. 
The Terms of Reference (TOF) of the Commission are different from that of 
the Sarkaria Commission. The Commission is basically entrusted with the 
task of taking a fresh look at and recommend for the relative roles and 
responsibilities of each level of government and their inter-relations in the 
context of the „profound changes‟ („sea-changes‟) that the polity and 
economy have undergone over the last two decades. The TOF of the 
Commission is wide indeed, and cover a lot of grounds (Notification No. 
IV/12013/9/2004-CSR): working of the existing arrangements between the 
Union and the States, the healthy practices followed, judicial 
pronouncements on federalism in India, the role of the Governors, 
emergency provisions, panchayati Raj Institutions, inter-state river waters 
dispute and so on. But the Commission has been particularly reminded of 
taking the „social and economic developments that have taken place over the 
last two decades‟ ( read the period of India‟s globalization) into account,  of 
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 This may not be entirely true because attempts since the 1990s have been made to 
revive such institutions, and the NCRWC report also strongly recommended in favor 
of the same. For instance, the Inter State Council (ISC) held its first meeting on 10. 
10. 90, and held 10 meetings until 9. 12. 96. It is reported that the ISC had adopted 
all the 247 recommendations of the Sarkaria Commissiion relating to centre-state 
relations, and even 179 recommendations have been implemented. (For further 
details, http://interstatecouncil.nic.in/agenda_isc.htm ) accessed on November 8, 
2009 
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„availing emerging opportunities for sustained and rapid growth for 
alleviating poverty and illiteracy‟ etc.  
 
The other areas on which the Commission is mandated to review, 
examine, and recommend on the role, responsibility and jurisdiction of the 
Union vis-à-vis the States deserve special mention: „during major and 
prolonged outbreaks of communal violence, caste violence or any other 
social conflict leading to prolonged and escalated violence‟; „in the planning 
and implementation of the mega projects like the inter-linking of rivers, that 
would normally take 15-20 years for completion and hinge vitally on the 
support of the States; in promoting effective devolution of powers and 
autonomy to Panchayati Raj Institutions and Local Bodies including the 
Autonomous Bodies under the 6th Schedule of the Constitution within a 
specified period of time; in promoting the concept and practice of 
independent planning and budgeting at the District level; the need for freeing 
inter-State trade in order to establish a unified and integrated domestic 
market as also in the context of the reluctance of State Governments to adopt 
the relevant Sarkaria Commission‟s recommendation in chapter XVIII of its 
report; the feasibility of a supporting legislation under Article 355 for the 
purpose of suo moto deployment of Central forces in the States if and when 
the situation so demands.
15
 
 
 
THE PUNCHHI COMMISSION’S CONTEXT AND TERMS OF 
REFERENCE 
 
The Commission in its „Introductory‟ to the Questionnaire took cognizance 
of the highly centralized nature of Indian federation until now, and 
emphasized two interlinked contexts that are of particular relevance to the 
Commission. First, India‟s acceptance of globalization since the early 1990s 
is highlighted including the removal of the so-called „license-permit raj‟ 
(LPR), and the restoration of the market in its place. The same context 
necessitated „more space in economic policy making‟ to be provided to the 
States. Added to it, the Commission already indicated its preference for more 
autonomy for the States when it stated: „Although the States were expected 
to perform functions on a scale larger than before, their access to tax powers 
and borrowing remained limited‟. (Punchi Commission: 10) Side by side, the 
Commission has also taken note of the inadequate powers and resources of 
the local bodies, rural and urban.  
 
Second, the Commission has also taken note of the very significant 
political change in India in recent years: the rise of regional parties and 
coalition governments. Coupled with that, the favourable judicial 
pronouncements by the country‟s highest court have increasingly 
circumscribed the centre‟s powers of intervention (President‟s Rule under 
Art 356) in the states.  
 
The Commission‟s mandate is conditioned by the reality of 
globalization; the frequent references to the role of the market, reference to 
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 Article 355 states: Duty of the Union to protect States against external aggression 
and internal disturbances---„It shall be the duty of the Union to protect every State 
against external aggression and internal disturbance and to ensure that  the 
Government of every state is carried on in accordance with the provisions of this 
Constitution‟. 
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Article 301 of the Indian Constitution (freedom of trade, commerce and 
intercourse within the Indian Union), references to investment, growth and 
development, and the need for a „radical shift in planning strategy‟ and so on 
are indicative of this preference. Above all, the Commission‟s „basic 
question‟ is clear enough: 
 
Are the existing arrangements governing Centre-State relations---
legislative, executive and financial---envisage in the Constitution, as 
they have evolved over the years in a manner that can meet the 
aspirations of the Indian society as also the „requirements of an 
increasingly globalizing world?‟ (Punchi Commission: 11) 
 
Since the Commission is still working, we are not in a position to predict 
things, or even analyze the nature of federation that is envisaged. But the 
public statement of the chairman in one of the commissioned workshops on 
the same subject in the Punjab University on 10 December 2008 helps us to 
read his mind. Justice Punchhi defended the case for „stronger states‟, for a 
strong Centre could exist only when the States are strong. He also drew 
attention to the need for accommodation of regional aspirations: “The 
accommodation of regional aspirations within the overarching framework of 
country‟s unity is the very foundation of a successful federal structure,” 
(Address to the North-western regional workshop on Centre-state relations in 
India at Panjab University here 10 December 2008) He also stressed on the 
globalizing context of India, and the need for managing the transition 
successfully. He asserted that „harmonious Centre-State relations occupy a 
significant place in this task‟. The importance of different layers of 
government, their need for revenues for ensuring good governance etc are 
recognized by him. (Tribune News Service December 10, 2008) 
 
 
LOCAL GOVERNMENT REFORMS 
 
Since the passage of the 73
rd
 and 74
th
 Constitution Amendment Acts (1992), 
local governing bodies, rural and urban, have increasingly emerged as 
another tier of India‟s federal system though subject still to many 
inadequacies and limitations
16
. Until 1992, institutionalization of rural self-
governing bodies (known as „panchayats‟), and urban bodies (municipalities, 
municipal corporations, and nagar panchayats) was a matter of the sweet 
will of the State governments because the State then had no constitutional 
obligation to organize them. Although some States did organize them for a 
variety of political purposes, the all-India scenario was pretty dismal. The 
73
rd
 and 74
th
 Constitutional Amendments (1992) made it constitutionally 
obligatory on the part of the States to regularly form such bodies and endow 
them with powers and responsibilities so that they function as units of self-
government. The picture since has improved a lot and such sub-state level 
local government bodies are today recognized as a distinct tier of Indian 
federalism.  
                                                        
16
 Even the Punchhi Commission in its „Introductory‟ pointed out many of the 
limitations of the local government bodies. Note the following concern of the 
Commission: The Constitution was amended to rectify the situation by giving these 
institutions Constitutional status with the hope that they would function as a third 
tier of governance. However, empowering them adequately remained a challenge.‟ 
(p. 10) (For further details, The Introductory to Questionnaires (2008) New Delhi: 
The Punchi Commission) 
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The subject has received and is still receiving a lot of academic 
attention
17
. Both the acts were, incidentally, passed during the Congress 
Party government at the Centre headed by the Prime Minister late 
Narasingha Rao. The rural local government known as Panchayati Raj‟ in 
particular has figured in the CMP (2004). Four aspects are of important 
consideration here. First, it is said that the UPA government would ensure 
that „all funds to states for implementation of poverty alleviation and rural 
development schemes by Panchayats are neither delayed nor diverted.‟   
Second, UPA government would consider sending funds directly to the 
panchayats after consultations with the states. Third, panchayats would be 
elected regularly. Fourth, Gram Sabha would be the foundation of 
panchayati raj. On the performance side, the UPA government is said to 
have taken a few measures: the formation of a group of ministers under the 
Ministry of Panchayati Raj for strengthening panchayats and finance their 
devolution; the funds for Backward Regions Grant Fund (newly instituted) 
(for designated 250 such districts) is being implemented through panchayats; 
panchayats have been assigned the central role in implementing and 
monitoring the National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme (NREGS) 
and so on.  The NREGS of the central government committed to providing 
100 days‟ work for the rural poor has remained one of the most successful 
governmental interventions in favour of the rural poor in recent times though 
the success rates of the States implementing it have varied a lot. How far the 
Gram Sabha (comprising the total electorate of a village panchayat) develops 
into the real foundation of panchayati raj, as a self-governing institution, as 
defined as such by the 73
rd
 Constitution Amendment Act (1992), is a moot 
question. Also, the real effectiveness of the local government bodies in India 
apparently pales into insignificance when they are found to be responsible 
for only 4.39 per cent of the combined central and state expenditures in India 
(2002-03) (expenditure-GNP ration during the same period was 1.71 per 
cent) in contrast with that of the advanced countries where the figures range 
between 20-35 per cent normally, and in some cases, is as high as 45 per 
cent (Denmark) and 41 per cent (Finland).
18
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See, for instance, Bhattacharyya, H. (1998) Micro-Foundations of Bengal 
Communism, Delhi: Ajanta; Mitra, Subrata. K. (2001) „Making Local Government 
Work: local elites, panchayati  raj and governance in India‟ in Kohli, A. (ed.) The 
Success of India‟s Democracy, Cambridge: CUP, 103-27; Bhattacharyya, H. (2002) 
Making Local Democracy Work in India, New Delhi: Vedams; Jain, L. C (ed.) 
(2005) Decentralization and Local Governance (Essays for George Matthew), New 
Delhi: Orient Longman; Jha, S. N. and Mathur, P. C. (1999) (eds) Decentralization 
and Local Politics, New Delhi: Sage Publications; and Baviskar, B. and Matthew, G 
(eds) (2009) Inclusion and Exclusion in Local Governance: Field Studies from Rural 
India,  New Delhi: Sage Publications. 
18See, Issac, T. M. Thomas and Chakraborty, P „ Intergovernmental Transfers: 
Disquieting Trends and the Thirteenth Finance Commission‟, Economic and 
Political Weekly, October 25, 2008, 86-92, esp. „Transfers to Local Self-
Governments‟, 91-92. See also, Bandopadhyay, D. „Guiding Role of Central 
Finance Commission regarding States Counterparts‟, Economic and Political 
Weekly, Vol. XL111, No. 22, May 31-June 6, 2008, p. 27. 
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CONTINUITY BETWEEN NDA AND UPA 
 
In the above, I have indicated areas of discontinuity as well as continuity, to 
some extent, between the NDA and the UPA. In this section, I shall 
concentrate on the performance side of the UPA with reference to two 
issues, and show the continuity between the two regimes.  
 
(a) Backward Regions Grant Fund 
 
The UPA‟a approach to Indian federalism, to the States, to be precise, does 
not represent a complete break with that of the NDA (1999-2004), its 
predecessor. In some fundamental respects, such as, understanding of Indian 
nationhood, which have significant bearing on Indian federalism, the UPA 
and the NDA are set apart. But in the ongoing and practical aspects of 
governance, there is continuity. This is so because first of all the policies are 
long-term, and second, a sudden withdrawal of policies with the change of 
government is not cost-effective, but counter-productive. The Backward 
States Grant Fund programme of the UPA is one major instance of 
continuity as well as a break with the NDA. The programme was begun 
during the NDA government during the Tenth Plan period as Rashtriya Sama 
Vikas Yogna (RSVY) in 2003-04. Its purpose was to ensure development of 
the backward States by helping to create productive assets in the same. The 
RSVY has not been discontinued, but is subsumed under the UPA‟s BRGF 
with the wider coverage of districts, and far greater amount of funds. In 
terms of the objectives, there is very little difference though. The 
programme, „aims to catalyze development in backward areas by providing 
infrastructure, promoting good governance and agrarian reforms, covering, 
through supplementary infrastructure and capacity building, the substantial 
development inflows into these district‟.19 In terms of coverage, while the 
RSVY had 147 districts in 27 States, the Backward Region Grant Fund 
(BRGF) covers 250 districts in 27 States. Interestingly, both the NDA and 
the UPA have  included 27 of 28 States of India under the above progamme. 
The BRGF placed under the Ministry of Rural Development has two funding 
windows: a Capability Building Fund, and untied grant fund that takes the 
factor of population into account. Today, the RSVY is part of the BRFG 
which has broader coverage.  
 
However, the progamme was launched as late as February 19, 2007, 
that is, after about two years in office of the UPA. While launching the 
programme from Barpeta district in Assam, a backward district in a 
Backward State on February 19, 2007, the Prime Minister of India, Dr. 
Monmohan Singh, said that a sum of Rs. 3750 crore were available for 250 
backward districts of India (each district getting about Rs. 10-15 crore) for 
developing their infrastructure and for filling up gaps in development. He 
also pointed out that the entire programme would be implemented through 
the Panchayati Raj institutions and other local self-governing bodies. That 
way, it will give a great fillip to the panchayti raj as well as States. (Prime 
Minister‟s Office http://pmindia.nic.in/sppech/content4print.asp?id=507 
accessed on 9 November 2009) Data available on the implementation side of 
the programme up to 14. 9. 2009 is very encouraging: there has been nearly 
100 per cent implementation of the sum allocated and released for the 
                                                        
19
 Press Information Bureau for the Ministry of Rural Development) 
http://pibmumbai.gov.in/scripts/details.asp?releaseld=E2009FR37 accessed on 
November 9, 2009) 
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purpose. (http://pibmumbai.go.in/scripts/detail.asp?releaseld=E2009FR37 
accessed on November 9, 2009) The official assessment of the success of the 
programme has highlighted the tremendous participatory, decentralizing and 
capacity building effects of the programme at the grassroots of the polity:    
The programme has pioneered the tradition of working through the 
constitutionally empowered mechanisms of the Panchayats, Municipalities 
and the District Planning Committees. The programme has made the 
decentralized planning process more meaningful…. (source: as above) 
 
(b) Operation Sadhbhavna (Operation Goodwill) 
 
This is another area of continuity in policies and programmes between the 
NDA and the UPA. This programme of extending welfare and development 
activities to the border areas was a post-Kargil initiative of the Indian Army, 
and a brain child of Lt General Arjun Roy who was the leader of the 14
th
 
Corps of the Northern Command of the Indian Army, and who initiated it as 
part of the service that the military can deliver to the border areas, a service 
which will pave the way for the ideal military of the future. (Aggarwal and 
Bhan 2009: 519-42) It is a goodwill gesture of the army started with funds 
from the Central Government Border Area Development Fund and the 
Ministry of Defence in which the army engaged itself in various welfare and 
developmental activities in the border areas of J & K, more particularly 
Ladakh, in order to redress the credibility of the government and its 
institutions, as an „aid to civil government‟ so that people‟s trust is restored, 
so is their patriotism, and in the process, violence is disarmed. (Aggarwal 
and Bhan 2009: 520) The funds received for this programme since 2001 
from various sources are very sumptuous indeed: Rs. 603 million. (Aggarwal 
and Bhan 2009: 527) Operation Sadhbhavna has many limitations and 
contradictions too, but on the whole, social scientific assessment of the 
programme has identified many positive achievements. (Aggarwal and Bhan 
2009: 539)   
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
Scholars of comparative federalism have squarely agreed that there is no 
optimal level of relations between the Centre and the constituent units in a 
federation because both structural arrangements as well as operational 
dynamics vary a lot among federations. Structurally, as we have seen above, 
Indian federation remains centralized, but operationally the federation has 
been decentralized. The central concern among scholars of federalism is 
whether a dynamic political equilibrium is created and maintained or not. If 
the States are neglected in developmental process, if they do not get their 
due shares, if they suffer as a result of certain central policies, if the 
democratically elected State government is unlawfully dismissed by the 
Centre and so on, then the basis is laid of dissension in the relation between 
the States and the Centre that causes to disturb political equilibrium.  
If we take a slightly long-term view then we can suggest that because of a 
number of constitutional safeguards (e.g., circumscribed use of Article 356 
of the Constitution post-1994), the balance of relations in Indian federalism 
has since the 1990s shifted in favour of the States, which have been active 
participants in India‟s reform process too. The rise of multi-party (and that 
too, state-based) coalition government at the Centre, compulsions of 
implementing increasingly social welfarist and developmental programmes, 
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and of SAP , in particular, have meant inevitably the increased role of the 
States in Indian federalism. This is the unmistakable shift that Indian 
federalism has since the 1990s been experiencing. The successive coalition 
governments at the Centre have added values to it, more or less. The UPA 
seems to have added more value to it thereby further contributing to the 
shifts in Indian federalism without, however, giving up certain long-term 
consensus with regard to the socio-cultural basis of Indian federalism.  
 
This needs some discussion. Despite the similar nature of coalition 
partners (some of whom even changed Alliances), the BJP, the leader of the 
NDA, had had its own distinctive approach to federalism in India informed 
by its notion of nationhood, which is unitary and committed to smaller 
states. However, this commitment to smaller states on the part of the BJP is, 
as Hansen (Adeney 2005: 99) argued, informed by „a desire to limit the 
considerable power of the states, the regional sentiments, and vernacular 
public arenas‟ in order „to strengthen the Union Government‟. The „ethnic 
criteria‟ are thus underplayed in the BJP‟s scheme of things on the ground 
that they are potentially destabilizing and undermining the territorial 
integrity of the country. (Adeney 2005: 99). The NDA‟s efforts in creating in 
2000 the three news states of Jharkhand (out of Bihar), Chhatisgarh (out of 
Madhya Pradesh) and Uttaranchal (later Uttarakhand) (out of Uttar Pradesh) 
were not inspired by any specific, single ethnic marker, as has been the 
practice in the reorganization of States in India between the late 1950 and the 
1980s, but by „administrative‟ reasons, and is cited as an illustration of the 
Hindutva approach to Indian federalism.  Jaffrelot (1996) (cited in Adeney 
2005: 99)) said that the BJP „advocated the creation of 100 janapadas 
(administrative divisions grouping together several districts). These divisions 
are deliberately intended to divide the linguistic zones and ensure…..that 
they did not become „mini-nations‟.20 That of course did not mean that the 
NDA abandoned federalism in India, or the policies it followed were anti-
federal in the day-to-day practices of governance. Being the coalition of a 
large number of state-based regional parties, it could hardly afford to do so. 
But there is no evidence that ideologically there has been any revision of its 
perspective.  
 
UPA‟s approach, by contrast, is fundamentally different in this respect. 
It maintains its time-honoured sensitivity to cultural linguistic identity of the 
people of India, and its pluralist concept of Indian nationhood accommodates 
the idea of multi-ethnic basis of federal units of India. Three points in the 
CMP, 2004 here are worthy of mention‟  
 
First, the UPA committed itself to the formation of a Telengana State by 
carving up Andhra Pradesh, India‟s first linguistic State after independence, 
a demand for which is long-standing, and based in ethno-regional identity of 
the people of the areas. It must, however, be mentioned here that this 
commitment of the UPA was directly linked to the inclusion of Telengana 
Rashtraraksha Samity (TRS), as its ally, a party which had been holding on 
to the mantle of struggle for a Telengana State since the 1970s. The TRS 
                                                        
20
 The Jana Sangh, the BJP‟s immediate political predecessor, had organizational 
units along administrative lines, as depicted above, which was at variance with the 
INC‟s linguistically federal organizational structure, particularly since 1917, which 
was to become the standard approach widely accepted throughout India.  
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withdrew itself from the UPA subsequently though on the presumed ground 
that the UPA was not taking up the Telengana issue seriously.
21
  
 
Second, the UPA committed itself to the issue of „declaring all 
languages in the Eighth Schedule of the Constitution as official languages‟. 
The provisions for the Eighth Schedule of the Constitution, as any student of 
Indian federalism knows, were designed to accord recognition to linguistic 
identity of the people in the regions of India. As the history of Indian 
federalism shows, in many cases, this linguistic recognition has served to 
prepare the basis of statehood within the federation if the particular language 
group has been found to be territorially rooted.  
 
Third, the UPA committed itself to declare Tamil as a classical 
language of India. Tamil has already been declared a „classical language‟ of 
India.  It is beyond doubt that this was a price that the UPA had to pay for 
support of its Tamil partner, the DMK. All in all, ethno-culturally, the 
UPA‟s approach to federalism in India does not deviate as yet from the 
Congress‟s old approach of multiculturalism and the goal of unity in 
diversity although the approach was never a fool-proof, and without many 
blemishes.  
 
As a final remark I would emphasize that given the commitment of the 
UPA to globalization and market economy coupled with the gradual 
withdrawal of the welfare state in conditions of extreme unevenness, 
diversity, regional imbalances, and large scale deprivations across the length 
and breadth of society in India, there is genuine ground for fear and 
suspicion about the prospects of holding on to political unity born of a 
multicultural reality. As I have argued elsewhere (Bhattacharyya 2010: 172-
73), the withdrawal of the welfare state in conditions of ethno-cultural 
diversity prepares the ground for „distributional conflicts‟ which is a bad 
omen for political unity, or political equilibrium in India.  
 
 
                                                        
21
 The Telengana state has been conceded by the UPA-led Union Government on 9
th
 
December 2009 after 11 days‟ of fast-unto-death of the top leader of the TRS Mr. K. 
Chandrasekhar Rao. This has of course provoked unprecedented opposition from 
within Andhra Pradesh, created a political crisis in the state, and sparked off 
demands for more news states in different parts of India. 
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